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Abstract 
This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model where asymmetric information 
about asset quality leads to asset illiquidity. Banking arises endogenously in this 
environment as banks can pool illiquid assets to average out their idiosyncratic qualities 
and issue liquid liabilities backed by pooled assets whose total quality is public 
information. Moreover, the liquidity mismatch in banks’ balance sheets leads to 
endogenous bank capital (outside equity) requirements for preventing bank runs. The 
model indicates that banking has both positive and negative effects on long-run economic 
growth and that business-cycle dynamics of asset prices, asset illiquidity and bank capital 
requirements are interconnected. 
JEL classification: E44, G21, D82 
Bank classification: Financial stability; Financial system regulation and policies  
Résumé 
L’auteur présente un modèle d’équilibre général dynamique dans lequel l’asymétrie de 
l’information relative à la qualité des actifs entraîne leur illiquidité. L’activité bancaire 
est générée de façon endogène : les banques peuvent regrouper les actifs illiquides de 
façon à ce que leurs caractéristiques idiosyncrasiques se neutralisent et émettre des 
passifs illiquides adossés au bloc d’actifs constitué, dont la qualité globale est connue de 
tous. Dans le modèle, la disparité qui existe en matière de liquidité entre les actifs et les 
passifs figurant au bilan des banques impose la détention de fonds propres (l’apport de 
capitaux extérieurs) afin de prévenir des retraits massifs de dépôts. Le modèle indique 
que l’activité bancaire a des effets tant positifs que négatifs sur la croissance économique 
à long terme et que la dynamique du cycle des prix d’actifs, l’illiquidité des actifs et le 
niveau requis de fonds propres sont interdépendants. 
Classification JEL : E44, G21, D82 
Classification de la Banque : Stabilité financière; Réglementation et politiques relatives 
au système financier 
 
 1 Introduction
This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model of banking where asymmetric
information about asset quality leads to illiquidity of real assets, liquidity transformation by
banks, and bank capital requirements endogenously. The model provides explanations as to
why banks can issue liquid liabilities while other assets are illiquid, and why part of bank
liabilities must be outside equity, i.e., bank capital. Using this model, this paper analyzes the
long-run eﬀects of banking on economic growth as well as business-cycle dynamics of asset
prices, asset illiquidity and bank capital requirements in response to productivity shocks and
changes in the degree of asymmetric information. This paper also discusses the implications
of the model for dynamic bank capital requirements recently discussed in policy forums.1
The model is a version of the AK model, where goods are produced from productive real
assets (physical capital) and new real assets are produced from goods. In the model, the
fraction of agents who can produce new real assets, which is determined by idiosyncratic
shocks, is so small that income from these agents’ real assets is not enough to achieve
the eﬃcient level of aggregate investment in new real assets. Agents who can produce
new real assets can obtain goods from other agents by selling their existing real assets in
a competitive secondary market. However, because the productivity of each real asset is
private information for the seller in the secondary market, the secondary market price of real
assets becomes identical for every real asset sold, undervaluing high-quality real assets. The
market’s undervaluation discourages agents who can produce new real assets from selling the
high-quality fraction of their real assets, resulting in a decline in the transfer of goods to these
agents, which reduces aggregate investment in new real assets. The market’s undervaluation
is the deﬁnition of illiquidity in this paper.
This basic feature of the model is similar to the ﬁndings of Eisfeldt (2004) on illiquidity
1For example, see the reports by the Bank for International Settlements (2008), the Financial Stability
Forum (2009), and the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (2009).
2of real assets due to asymmetric information about asset quality.2 It is also closely related
to the results of Kiyotaki and Moore (2008), who introduce a constraint on the resaleable
fraction of real assets in a dynamic general equilibrium model. This paper endogenizes
the resaleability constraint in Kiyotaki and Moore’s model as agents choose not to sell the
undervalued fraction of their real assets in the secondary market.
The model shows that banking emerges endogenously in this environment. While the
illiquidity of real assets leads to agents’ demand for liquid assets, banks can meet this demand
as they can pool illiquid assets to average out the assets’ idiosyncratic qualities, which makes
the total quality of bank assets public information. As a result, bank liabilities backed by
pooled bank assets are priced fairly in the market, i.e., liquid. The model also explains
existence of bank capital requirements as the liquidity mismatch in banks’ balance sheets
makes self-fulﬁlling bank runs possible if all bank liabilities are deposits. The holders of bank
liabilities require part of bank liabilities to be outside equity (i.e., bank capital) to prevent
bank runs.3
The comparative statics of the model indicate that banking has both positive and negative
eﬀects on long-run economic growth. The positive eﬀect is a direct eﬀect of supply of liquid
liabilities by banks, which increases the transfer of goods to agents who can produce new
real assets through sales of liquid assets, expanding aggregate investment in new real assets.
The negative eﬀect is an indirect general equilibrium eﬀect, or externality, of supply of liquid
liabilities by banks, which raises the required rate of returns for illiquid real assets and thus
lowers their price. This eﬀect reduces the transfer of goods to agents who can produce
new real assets through sales of illiquid real assets. The numerical examples of the model
show that the positive eﬀect dominates the negative eﬀect if there is no operational cost of
2Both Eisfeldt (2004) and this paper impose Akerlof’s (1970) lemon problem on the competitive secondary
asset market. Kurlat (2009) analyzes the eﬀect of learning in a similar model of illiquid assets. See the paper
by Gale (1992) for a model of competitive markets with adverse selection in a more general setup.
3This is the same type of self-fulﬁlling bank run as analyzed by Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
3banking, but that this is not the case if the cost is large.4
The dynamic analysis of the model shows that business-cycle dynamics of asset prices,
asset illiquidity and bank capital requirements are interconnected. The model incorporates
two types of business-cycle shocks: productivity shocks and changes in the degree of asym-
metric information. Changes in the degree of asymmetric information cause ﬂuctuations in
the economic growth rate because resulting changes in asset illiquidity aﬀect the transfer of
goods to agents who can produce new real assets. The model shows that, for both types
of shocks, higher secondary market prices of real assets during economic booms mitigate
illiquidity of real assets because higher prices make agents who can produce new real assets
willing to sell better real assets in the secondary market. As the average quality of real
assets sold in the market improves, the market’s undervaluation (illiquidity) of high-quality
real assets becomes less. Also, less illiquidity of real assets leads to higher market prices of
real assets as real assets become more convenient stores of wealth. Thus there are two-way
interactions of asset prices and asset illiquidity in equilibrium dynamics.
The model identiﬁes downside risk to the market value of real assets and expected illiquid-
ity of real assets as crucial factors for bank capital requirements. As these factors ﬂuctuate
over the business cycle, bank capital requirements are also dynamic. The model shows that,
when the aggregate productivity of real assets shifts between high and low states randomly,
bank capital requirements are pro-cyclical as pro-cyclical downside risk to the market value
of real assets becomes the dominant factor for bank capital requirements. However, when
a deterioration in asymmetric information causes an economic downturn, an increase in
expected illiquidity of real assets raises bank capital requirements. These results suggest
that the so-called “counter-cyclical capital buﬀer” recommended by the Financial Stability
Forum (2009) is eﬀective in preventing self-fulﬁlling bank runs when downside risk to the
4In the model, the operational cost of banking is a bank equity holding cost for agents, which generates
an equity premium on bank equity.
4market value of bank assets is the dominant concern regarding ﬁnancial stability, but that
the counter-cyclical capital buﬀer would not help to free up bank capital as designed in a
liquidity crisis.5
The model of banking in this paper adds to the vast literature on asymmetric information
and ﬁnancial intermediation. Speciﬁcally, the model is related to the papers by Williamson
(1988) and Gorton and Pennacchi (1990).6 Related to their work, this paper analyzes the
role of banks in providing bank liabilities free of asymmetric information that contaminates
the secondary market for real assets. As in Gorton and Pennacchi’s model, bank liabilities
circulate among agents.
This paper is also related to the model of Holmstr¨ om and Tirole (1998) as it focuses on
the eﬀect of asset pooling by banks. In Holmstr¨ om and Tirole’s model, banks pool short-term
assets to provide liquidity insurance for ﬁrms that invest in long-term assets, i.e., funding
liquidity. In contrast, in this paper, asset pooling by banks creates liquid bank liabilities,
i.e., market liquidity.7
The analysis of bank capital requirements is related to the ﬁndings of Diamond and Ra-
jan (2000, 2001), who analyze the role of outside bank equity as a buﬀer to volatile bank
asset value in a model where both the role of banking and bank fragility arise endogenously
from costly enforcement of debt repayment. Also, this paper’s model incorporates equilib-
rium pricing of liquid bank liabilities on the basis of agents’ demand for liquid assets as in
Holmstr¨ om and Tirole (2001). This paper incorporates these features of banking in a uniﬁed
5The counter-cyclical capital buﬀer requires banks to increase bank capital during booms to absorb losses
in downturns.
6Williamson models a bank as a coalition of agents that internalizes the externality of adverse selection
in the asset market. Modelling banks as a coalition is similar to the model of Boyd and Prescott (1986).
Gorton and Pennacchi analyze the role of banks in providing information-insensitive riskless bank debt that
circulates among uninformed agents who avoid trading risky assets with informed agents.
7In fact, Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) foresee this result by interpreting their resaleability constraint as a
reduced-form representation of the eﬀectiveness of liquidity creation by banks through asset pooling when
asymmetric information about asset quality exists. This paper conﬁrms their insight.
5framework, adding to the literature on dynamic general equilibrium models of banking.8
In addition, the key feature of banks in the models of Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001)
is that banks have higher collateral value of borrowers’ assets than other agents. This paper
derives this feature of banks endogenously from the ability for banks to conduct liquidity
transformation, showing that banks intermediate collateralized lending.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Sec-
tion 3 solves the model. Section 4 analyzes the eﬀects of asset illiquidity and liquidity
transformation by banks on aggregate investment. Section 5 investigates the dynamics of
asset illiquidity, asset prices and bank capital requirements. Section 6 discusses why banks
intermediate collateralized lending. Section 7 analyzes the sensitivity of bank capital re-
quirements to the bank liquidation procedure. Section 8 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Agents
Time and utility.—Time is discrete and there is a continuum of inﬁnite-lived agents who






where ci,t is the consumption of goods, i is the index for each agent, t denotes the time
period, and β (∈ (0,1)) is the time discount rate.
Production of goods.—Agents can produce homogeneous goods using trees (physical cap-
8For examples of dynamic general equilibrium models of banking in the literature, see the papers by
Williamson (1987), Chen (2001) and Kato (2006). The last two papers extend the models of Holmstr¨ om and
Tirole (1997, 1998), respectively, to dynamic general equilibrium models.
6ital) they own at the beginning of each period:
yi,t = αtki,t−1, (2)
where yi,t is output, ki,t−1 is the quantity of trees held at the beginning of period t, and αt
is an aggregate productivity shock.
Depreciation of trees.—After production, each inﬁnitesimal unit of trees, which are di-





for δ ∈ [¯ δ − ∆t, ¯ δ + ∆t], (3)
where fi,δ,t is the density of agent i’s trees that depreciate at rate δ in period t, ¯ δ (∈ (0,1))
is the average depreciation rate, and ∆t (∈ (0,1−¯ δ)) is a stochastic mean-preserving spread
to the range of depreciation rates of trees.
Depreciation in the model represents permanent shocks to the individual productivity
levels of real assets in general. Given that private information about productivity of real
assets exists widely in reality, assume that the depreciation rate of each tree is only observed
by the agent who owns the tree at the beginning of the period.9 Also assume that the
current depreciation rate of each tree becomes public information at the beginning of the next
period.10 This assumption keeps the information dynamics in the model simple and tractable.
Given these assumptions, ∆t becomes a shock to the degree of asymmetric information in
9Physical depreciation of consumer durables such as cars and houses is a good example of private infor-
mation about productivity of real assets. For empirical analysis of business capital, see Eisfeldt and Rampini
(2006).
10Assume that all agents can learn the previous depreciation rate of each tree by observing the amount
of goods produced by each tree. After the revelation of depreciation rates, trees net of depreciation become
homogeneous once again and then each inﬁnitesimal unit of homogeneous trees depreciates at its own rate.
7the economy in this paper.11
The secondary market for trees.—After depreciation of trees, agents can trade trees in
a competitive secondary market. The depreciation rate of each tree sold is private infor-
mation for the seller, given the assumption in the previous paragraph. Assume that agents
are anonymous so that the price of each tree in the market cannot be contingent on the
characteristics of the buyer or the seller, including the volume of sales by the seller. As a
consequence, every tree is traded at an identical price in each period.12 At the same time
with the secondary market for trees, agents can also trade bank liabilities (demand deposits
and bank equity) in competitive markets. The details on banks will be described in the next
subsection.
Investment in new trees.—After asset market transactions, a fraction of agents can invest
goods in production of new trees: ni,t = φi,txi,t, where ni,t is the quantity of new trees,
φi,t ∈ {0,φ} (φ > 0), and xi,t is the amount of goods invested in new trees. Thus, only
agents with φi,t = φ have investment opportunity. The value of φi,t is determined by an
idiosyncratic Markov process with a transition probability function, P, such that P(φi,t+1 =
φ | φi,t = φ) = ρP and P(φi,t+1 = 0 | φi,t = 0) = ρU for all i and t. Each agent learns the
value of φi,t at the beginning of period t.
The maximization problem for each agent.—Each agent maximizes the utility function
(1) subject to the following constraints in each period, which are implied by the assumptions
11Williamson (1987) analyzes the eﬀects of a mean-preserving spread to the distribution of investment
returns. In his model, the mean-preserving spread worsens credit rationing due to costly state veriﬁcation.
In this paper, the mean-preserving spread worsens adverse selection in the competitive secondary market for
trees as described below.
12This anonymous feature of the market is similar to centralized asset markets in reality, such as stock
exchanges. If there are multiple competitive markets sorted by the quantity of trees sold by each seller,
then the quantity could signal the average depreciation rate of trees sold in each market. Even in this case,
anonymity of sellers would let each seller split her trees into multiple lots and sell them in diﬀerent markets
to maximize the total revenue from the sales. This paper abstracts from the interaction between competitive
market prices and this type of strategic seller behaviour.
8set so far:
ci,t + xi,t + Qthi,t + bi,t + (1 + ζ)Vtsi,t
= αtki,t−1 + Qt
  ¯ δ+∆t
¯ δ−∆t
li,δ,t dδ + ˜ Rtbi,t−1 + (Dt + Vt)si,t−1, (4)
ki,t = φi,txi,t + (1 − ˆ δt)hi,t +















, ci,t ≥ 0, xi,t ≥ 0, hi,t ≥ 0, bi,t ≥ 0, si,t ≥ 0, (6)
where hi,t is the quantity of trees gross of depreciation bought in the secondary market,
li,δ,t is the density of trees gross of depreciation with depreciation rate δ sold by the agent,
Qt is the secondary market price of trees, ˆ δt is the average depreciation rate of trees sold
in the secondary market, bi,t−1 is the amount of demand deposits held at the beginning of
period t, si,t−1 represents the units of bank equity held at the beginning of period t, ˜ Rt is
the ex-post deposit interest rate, Dt is the amount of bank dividends per unit of equity, Vt
is the ex-dividend price of bank equity, and ζ (> 0) is an exogenous marginal cost of holding
bank equity, which is a reduced-form representation of equity management costs, such as
transaction costs and monitoring costs.13 This cost leads to an equity premium on bank
equity as described later. Each agent chooses {ci,t, xi,t, hi,t, li,δ,t bi,t si,t}∞
t=0 taking as given
the probability distribution of {Qt, ˆ δt, ˜ Rt, Dt, Vt, αt, ∆t, φi,t}∞
t=0.14
Equations (4) and (5) are the ﬂow-of-funds constraint and the law of motion for trees
net of depreciation (i.e., ki,t), respectively, and Constraints (6) are a short-sale constraint
on trees and non-negativity constraints on the choice variables. Note that the market price
of trees, Qt, is identical irrespective of the value of δ in li,δ,t in Equation (4) because the
depreciation rate of each tree sold is private information for the seller. Also, because every
13The face value of deposits is protected by the court. In contrast, equity holders need to identify the cash
ﬂow for each bank and negotiate with the bank on the amount of dividends in each period.
14The choice variables are state-contingent. The notation of state contingency is omitted here.
9unit of trees is inﬁnitesimal, the average depreciation rate of trees bought by each buyer
equals the average depreciation rate of trees sold in the market, ˆ δt, by the law of large
numbers.15 Thus, (1−ˆ δt)hi,t in Equation (5) is the total quantity of trees net of depreciation
that the agent obtains through the secondary market with certainty. In Equations (5) and
(6), ki,t−1(2∆t)−1 is the density of the agent’s trees with depreciation rate δ as speciﬁed by
Equation (3).
Equation (4) and Constraints (6) imply that agents cannot borrow due to their anonymity,
which makes it diﬃcult to enforce their intertemporal commitments. Assume that new trees
cannot be collateral when agents invest in them because new trees materialize only at the
beginning of the next period. The assumption of no borrowing lets the model have a closed-
form solution to dynamic equilibrium equations when there is no bank, which enables the
basic features of the model to be clariﬁed analytically. Section 6 will extend the model
by allowing agents to borrow against new trees. The section will show that the ability of
banks in pooling illiquid assets and providing liquid liabilities, which will be described in
the next subsection, increases the collateral value of new trees for banks, inducing banks to
intermediate collateralized lending.
2.2 Banks
There are many small homogeneous banks that buy trees in the secondary market by ﬁ-
nancing the cost through issuing demand deposits and bank equity to agents in competitive
markets. In contrast to agents, banks are not anonymous. Banks can commit to redeeming
deposits and paying dividends by goods produced from their trees in the future with no
agency problem. This paper considers only deposit and equity contracts, assuming that con-
15This is a common feature of competitive equilibrium models with adverse selection. See Gale (1992) and
Eisfeldt (2004) for example.
10tingent contracts are not veriﬁable.16 The production function for goods and the distribution
of depreciation rates of trees for banks are the same as in Equations (2) and (3) for agents.
The ﬂow of funds and the law of motion for trees for each bank.—Because banks are
homogeneous, consider a representative bank to simplify the notation. The ﬂow-of-funds
constraint on the representative bank and the law of motion for its trees are:
DtSB,t−1 + ˜ RtBB,t−1 + Qt(HB,t − LB,t) = αtKB,t−1 + BB,t + Vt(SB,t − SB,t−1), (7)
KB,t = (1 − ˆ δt)HB,t + (1 − ¯ δ)(KB,t−1 − LB,t), (8)
where SB,t−1 represents the units of bank equity outstanding at the beginning of period t,
BB,t−1 is the amount of demand deposits outstanding at the beginning of period t, HB,t is
the amount of trees gross of depreciation bought by the bank in the secondary market, LB,t
is the amount of trees gross of depreciation sold by the bank in the secondary market, and
KB,t−1 is the amount of trees held at the beginning of period t.17 Equation (8) implies that
banks, like agents, do not know the depreciation rate of each tree they buy in the secondary
market, so the average depreciation rate of trees bought by each bank in the market equals
ˆ δt by the law of large numbers, as in Equation (5) for agents. Also, note that LB,t is not
speciﬁc to the depreciation rate of each tree sold. It is assumed that banks do not know
the depreciation rate of each tree they have, so they cannot sell their trees selectively. As
a result, in the last term on the right-hand side of Equation (8), the average depreciation
rate of trees sold by each bank equals the average depreciation rate of all of its trees, ¯ δ, by
16Thus the analysis of the (non) existence of bank runs under the optimal contingent contract, such as the
work by Green and Lin (2003), Peck and Shell (2003), Andolfatto and Nosal (2008) and Ennis and Keister
(2009), is beyond the scope of this paper. Also, note that equity is not contingent contracts that specify
contingent returns ex-ante. Instead, ex-post negotiation of dividends must take place as if default on debt
occurs every period. See Hart and Moore (1994) for more details on the feature of equity as a ﬁnancial
contract.
17The last term on the right-hand side of Equation (7) is the revenue from newly issued equity if it is
positive or the expenditure on equity repurchases if it is negative.
11the law of large numbers. This assumption makes banks keep holding trees in equilibrium
as shown by Proposition 1 below.18 Overall, banks do not have any informational advantage
over agents in the secondary market for trees and the only advantage of banks over agents
is the ability of banks to issue deposits and equity against the trees they hold.
Bank runs.—The ex-post deposit interest rate, ˜ Rt, equals the non-contingent ex-ante de-
posit contract rate denoted by ¯ Rt−1, which is determined in period t−1, if the representative
bank does not default. But assume that a self-fulﬁlling bank run occurs if the face value of
deposits, ¯ Rt−1BB,t−1, exceeds the liquidation value of trees held by the bank at the beginning
of the period, (αt+Qt)KB,t−1.19 In this case, the bank cannot roll over its deposits and must
maximize the repayment to depositors by liquidating all of the trees it owns. Because the
liquidation value of the bank’s trees is less than the face value of deposits, the bank must





¯ Rt−1, if ¯ Rt−1BB,t−1 ≤ (αt + Qt)KB,t−1,
(αt+Qt)KB,t−1
BB,t−1 , if ¯ Rt−1BB,t−1 > (αt + Qt)KB,t−1,
(9)
LB,t = KB,t−1,HB,t = Vt = Dt = 0, if ¯ Rt−1BB,t−1 > (αt + Qt)KB,t−1. (10)
The recovery rate of deposits in the second line of Equation (9) is determined by the ﬂow-
of-funds constraint (7), given Equation (10).
Note that the liquidation value of the representative bank’s trees, (αt+Qt)KB,t−1, is eval-
18If banks had private information about the depreciation rate of each tree they owned, then in equilibrium
the existence of banks would worsen the adverse selection problem in the secondary market for trees because
banks never have opportunity to invest in new trees and would sell only a low-quality fraction of their trees.
Even in this case, the average depreciation rate of trees held by each bank would be public information
through rational expectations of bank behaviour, which would make deposits and bank equity liquid as
explained below.
19As shown below, the present discounted value of future income generated by the bank’s trees exceeds
the liquidation value of trees in equilibrium. Thus, if the bank can roll over deposits, then the bank can
avoid default. However, if all of the depositors expect that the bank cannot roll over deposits, then their
expectations become self-fulﬁlling.
12uated by the competitive secondary market price of trees, Qt. The underlying assumptions
are that the only channel for banks to sell their trees is the competitive secondary market
and that each bank is so small that a failure of a bank does not aﬀect the market price.
Thus agents who run to a bank take Qt as given. Section 7 will extend the model to discuss
the eﬀect of an alternative bank liquidation procedure in which a bank hit by a bank run
can set up a market for liquidating the bank’s trees separately from the secondary market
for trees.
The model assumes no deposit insurance or suspension of convertibility of deposits by the
government, which would prevent self-fulﬁlling bank runs as shown by Diamond and Dybvig
(1983).20 This is a simplifying assumption, given that short-term funding not covered by
deposit insurance, such as wholesale funding, is an important source of ﬁnance for banks
and that suspension of convertibility of deposits is a drastic policy measure that is not often
used. As will be shown below, this assumption lets the model incorporate bank capital
requirements due to the risk of self-fulﬁlling bank runs, which enables this paper to analyze
dynamics of bank capital requirements with endogenous ﬂuctuations in illiquidity of bank
assets.
The maximization problem for each bank.—Given Equations (7)-(10), the representative
bank maximizes the value of the bank for equity holders, (Dt + Vt)SB,t−1, in each period
given the predetermined value of SB,t−1.21 In so doing, the bank internalizes the ﬁrst-order
conditions with respect to si,t and bi,t in the maximization problem for agents deﬁned by
Equations (1) and (4)-(6), which represent the responses of the ex-ante deposit contract rate,
20In this paper’s model, limiting the repayment of deposits to the ﬂow income from each bank’s trees
prevents bank runs because banks are not forced to sell their trees to redeem deposits. Even though the
ﬂow income from banks’ trees is not enough to redeem all deposits held by depositors who need to convert
deposits into goods (i.e., productive agents who were unproductive in the previous period), banks can redeem
deposits held by these agents by issuing new deposits to other agents, if there is no stochastic shock to the
economy.
21There is no disagreement between productive and unproductive equity holders, since the maximum of
each agent’s utility function increases in the agent’s net worth regardless of the value of φi,t, given the
probability distribution of exogenous variables for agents.
13¯ Rt, and the equity price, Vt, to the bank’s behaviour:

































and I denotes the set of all indices for agents. In Equations (12) and (14), Equation (9) is
substituted into ˜ Rt+1, and KB,t(BB,t)−1 is replaced with inﬁnity if BB,t = 0. The maximum
operators in Equations (13) and (14) indicate that the buyers of the bank liabilities are the
agents who value the liabilities the most.22 Note that the bank equity holding cost, ζ, makes
agents require a higher rate of return on bank equity than on deposits. This is an equity
premium.
Substituting Equation (11) into Equation (7) implies that (Dt + Vt)SB,t−1 is determined
recursively. The maximization problem for the representative bank is deﬁned as:
(Dt + Vt)SB,t−1 = Ωt(KB,t−1,BB,t−1, ¯ Rt−1) ≡
max
{HB,t,LB,t,BB,t, ¯ Rt}






s.t. Equations (8) − (10) and (12), LB,t ∈ [0,KB,t−1], HB,t ≥ 0, BB,t ≥ 0, (15)
22If there is no supply of bank liabilities, then the left-hand sides of Equations (11) and (12) need only
to be weakly greater than the right-hand sides. For this case, assume that the left-hand side equals the
right-hand side in each equation in equilibrium without loss of generality.
14where the last three constraints are a no short-sale constraint on trees in the secondary
market and non-negativity constraints on choice variables. The bank takes as given the
probability distribution of {Qt, ˆ δt, αt, ΛV,t, ΛR,t}∞
t=0.23
Note that banks can choose to shut down their business by liquidating all of their trees
if ﬁnancial intermediation is not proﬁtable. Thus, if banks conduct ﬁnancial intermediation
by buying trees and issuing liabilities, then it is an endogenous result in the model.
2.3 Shock processes
There are two types of aggregate shocks, αt and ∆t. Each type of shock follows a two-state
Markov process. More speciﬁcally, αt ∈ {¯ α,α}, ∆t ∈ {¯ ∆,∆}, and the transition probability
function denoted by P is such that P(αt+1 = ¯ α | αt = ¯ α) = ¯ ηα, P(αt+1 = α | αt = α) = η
α,
P(∆t+1 = ¯ ∆ | ∆t = ¯ ∆) = ¯ η∆, and P(∆t+1 = ∆ | ∆t = ∆) = η
∆ for all t.
2.4 Equilibrium conditions




  ¯ δ+∆t
¯ δ−∆t δ li,δ,t dδ d  + ¯ δ LB,t
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hi,t d  + HB,t =
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  ¯ δ+∆t
¯ δ−∆t
li,δ,t dδ d  + LB,t, (17)
 
I
bi,t d  = BB,t, (18)
 
I
si,t d  = SB,t, (19)
23Assume that if there is no existing equity holder for a bank (i.e., SB,t−1 = 0), then the bank maximizes
the net proﬁt from an initial public oﬀering of its equity and consumes the proﬁt right away. Because the
net proﬁt equals the value of Ωt, this case is covered by the maximization problem (15). It can be shown
that the net proﬁt from the initial public oﬀering becomes zero in equilibrium.
15where   is the measure of indices for agents on I. These equations are, in order, the deﬁnition
of ˆ δt and the market clearing conditions for trees, deposits, and bank equity. An equilibrium
in the model is characterized by fulﬁllment of the following: the maximization problem for
each agent deﬁned by Equations (1) and (4)-(6) is solved for all i ∈ I; the maximization
problem for the representative bank (15) is solved for t = 0,1,2,...; the bank and agents
hold rational expectations; and Equations (16)-(19) are satisﬁed for all t = 0,1,2,....
3 Equilibrium behaviour of agents and banks
This section solves the model. Call agents with φi,t = φ “productive” and those with
φi,t = 0 “unproductive”. Throughout the paper, suppose that the following conditions hold
in equilibrium:



















   
  φi,t = φ
 
. (22)
These conditions will be veriﬁed in the numerical examples of equilibria considered below.
The ﬁrst condition says that agents with one unit of goods can obtain a larger amount of
trees net of depreciation by investing in new trees than by buying trees in the secondary
market. Thus productive agents do not buy trees. The second and third conditions say that
the rate of return on investing in new trees for productive agents dominates the rates of
return on deposits and bank equity. Under these conditions, productive agents only invest
in new trees (i.e., xi,t > 0 and hi,t = bi,t = si,t = 0, if φi,t = φ) and unproductive agents
become the buyers of deposits and bank equity in equilibrium. Thus ΛV,t+1 and ΛR,t+1 are
16determined by the stochastic discount factor, βci,t(ci,t+1)−1, for unproductive agents.24
Also, hereafter, the number of exogenous states is limited to two by considering one of
the two types of aggregate shocks, αt and ∆t, at a time. If ¯ α > α, so that αt ﬂuctuates, then
set ¯ ∆ = ∆. Otherwise set ¯ α = α and ¯ ∆ > ∆. This assumption simpliﬁes the representative
bank’s problem about whether it should take the risk of a bank run, which makes the
computation of equilibrium dynamics tractable.
3.1 Asset illiquidity and adverse selection by agents
The maximization problem for each agent deﬁned by Equations (1) and (4)-(6) implies that
each agent sells a tree if the marginal revenue from the sale, Qt, is greater than the internal





ki,t−1(2∆t)−1, if Qt ≥ λi,t(1 − δ),
0, otherwise,
(23)
where λi,t is the shadow value of trees net of depreciation at the end of period t (i.e., ki,t),
so that λi,t(1 − δ) is the shadow value of trees with depreciation rate δ.25
In equilibrium, the shadow value of trees net of depreciation is less than or equal to the
marginal cost of obtaining them for each agent because otherwise the agent would be better
oﬀ cutting consumption to spend more on trees, which would contradict the deﬁnition of
24As shown by Equation (34) below, unproductive agents have an identical stochastic discount factor in
each period in equilibrium due to the log utility function.
25The shadow value of ki,t is given by current consumption, ci,t, multiplied by the Lagrange multiplier for
the law of motion for trees net of depreciation (Equation (5)) in the maximization problem for each agent
deﬁned by Equations (1) and (4)-(6).






−1, if φi,t = φ,
λU,t ≤ Qt(1 − ˆ δt)−1, if φi,t = 0,
(24)
where λU,t denotes the value of λi,t for unproductive agents. The value of λi,t for productive
agents equals the marginal cost of producing new trees. The right-hand side of the weak
inequality in Equation (24) is the marginal cost for unproductive agents to obtain trees
net of depreciation through the secondary market. If the inequality holds strictly, then




λU,t = Qt(1 − ˆ δt)−1, if hi,t > 0 for all i s.t. φi,t = 0,
hi,t = 0 for all i s.t. φi,t = 0, if λU,t < Qt(1 − ˆ δt)−1.
(25)
Equations (23) and (24) imply that there exists a lower bound for the depreciation rates






 ¯ δ − ∆t, 1 − Qtφ
 
, if φi,t = φ,
δU,t ≡ max
 ¯ δ − ∆t, 1 − Qt(λU,t)−1 
, if φi,t = 0.
(26)
For each agent, trees whose depreciation rates are lower than δi,t are illiquid in the sense that
the secondary market price of trees, Qt, is less than the internal value of the trees for the
holder. As a result, agents do not sell these trees (i.e., adverse selection). Hereafter, consider
δP,t and δU,t as the indicators of illiquidity of trees for productive agents and unproductive
agents, respectively.
26The maximum operator ensures that the value of δi,t is within the range of the distribution of depreciation
rates. Condition (20) and Equations (24) and (26) imply that δP,t < ˆ δt and δU,t ≤ ˆ δt. Thus δi,t ≤ ¯ δ + ∆t
for all i.
18Equation (16) implies that the adverse selection leads to ˆ δt > ¯ δ, if there exist illiquid trees
(i.e., if δP,t > ¯ δ−∆t or δU,t > ¯ δ−∆t). On the other hand, Condition (20) and Equation (26)
imply δP,t < ˆ δt, which leads to ˆ δt < ¯ δ + ∆t, i.e., a positive volume of trade in the secondary
market for trees, given Equation (16). Intuitively, productive agents sell some high-quality
trees (whose depreciation rates are below ˆ δt) despite the market’s undervaluation as the
return on investment in new trees exceeds the cost of the market’s undervaluation for these
trees. The supply of undervalued trees by productive agents saves the secondary market for
trees from a complete shutdown (ˆ δt = ¯ δ + ∆t).27
3.2 Liquidity transformation by banks
The solution to the maximization problem (15) leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 As assumed above, the number of exogenous states is two in each period.
Given the values of period-t variables, denote the smaller value of αt+1 + Qt+1 by ωt+1, the
larger value by ¯ ωt+1, and the conditional probability that αt+1 + Qt+1 = ¯ ωt+1 by Pt(¯ ωt+1).
Suppose Conditions (20)-(22) hold in equilibrium. Then:





αt + λB,t(1 − ¯ δ)
 
KB,t−1, if ¯ Rt−1BB,t−1 ≤ (αt + Qt)KB,t−1,
(αt + Qt)KB,t−1, if ¯ Rt−1BB,t−1 > (αt + Qt)KB,t−1,
(27)








B,t, respectively, are the present discounted
values of the future marginal income from the representative bank’s trees conditional on
27Note that the measure of the trees whose depreciation rates equal ¯ δ + ∆t is zero in the economy.


































   
φi,t = 0




























Also, if banks buy trees in the secondary market, then the present discounted value of the
future marginal income from the representative bank’s trees equals the marginal acquisition
cost of the trees and also banks keep holding their trees:
λB,t =
Qt
1 − ˆ δt
, if HB,t > 0, (31)
LB,t = 0, if ˆ δt > ¯ δ and HB,t > 0. (32)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Equation (27) implies that, because each bank can commit to paying all of the current
and future income from its trees to the holders of bank liabilities, the total market value
of bank liabilities, ˜ RtBB,t−1 + (Dt + Vt)SB,t−1, equals the present discounted value of the
current and future income from the bank’s trees, [αt +λB,t(1−¯ δ)]KB,t−1, given no bank run
in the current period. As shown by the ﬂow-of-funds constraint (4), agents can obtain this
value of goods when they transfer bank liabilities to other agents in the markets. Thus, bank
liabilities are fairly priced in the markets, i.e., liquid.
20Note that, if there were asymmetric information about the quality of each bank’s trees,
then bank liabilities would be illiquid like trees. This does not happen in the model because
asset pooling by each bank averages out the idiosyncratic depreciation rates of the bank’s
trees, so that the total quantity of trees net of depreciation held by each bank (i.e., (1 −
¯ δ)KB,t−1) becomes public information.
If ˆ δt > ¯ δ due to adverse selection as described in Section 3.1, then substituting Equation
(31) into Equation (27) and comparing the ﬁrst and second lines of Equation (27) imply
that agents can increase the market value of their assets by holding liquid bank liabilities
instead of illiquid trees. On the ﬂip side, liquidation of a bank’s trees due to a bank run is





cost of a bank run is so high that, despite an equity premium generated by the bank-equity
holding cost, ζ, each bank limits the face value of deposits, ¯ RtBB,t, to ωt+1KB,t, which is the
maximum face value of deposits without any possibility of a bank run in the next period.
Given the endogenous limit on the face value of deposits, Equations (11), (27) and (31)
imply that banks must ﬁnance by bank equity a part of the acquisition cost of banks’ trees,
which equals the present discounted value of the future income from the trees in equilibrium











   
 
 






which is positive, given ˆ δt > ¯ δ.
213.3 Equilibrium laws of motion for aggregate variables
Given the log utility function, each agent consumes a fraction 1 − β of net worth and saves
the rest in each period:
ci,t = (1 − β)wi,t, (34)
λi,tki,t + bi,t + (1 + ζ)Vtsi,t = βwi,t, (35)















ki,t−1 + ˜ Rtbi,t−1 + (Dt + Vt)si,t−1. (36)
In Equations (35) and (36), trees are evaluated by the shadow value of trees net of depreci-





B,t and HB,t > 0 for all t so that there is no bank run and banks
are always providing liquidity transformation services in equilibrium. Note that ˆ δt > ¯ δ is a




B,t. Substituting Equations (17)-(19), (24), (27), (31) and





















Qt(1 − ¯ δ)





28To conﬁrm Equations (34)-(36), apply the envelope theorem to the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to














































Qt(1 − ¯ δ)










dδ[ρPKP,t−1 + (1 − ρU)KU,t−1], (39)





dδ[(1 − ρP)KP,t−1 + ρUKU,t−1], (40)
KP,t + KU,t + KB,t = φXP,t + (1 − ¯ δ)(KP,t−1 + KU,t−1 + KB,t−1), (41)
ˆ δt =
θt−1
  ¯ δ+∆t
δP,t δ dδ +
  ¯ δ+∆t
δU,t δ dδ
θt−1(¯ δ + ∆t − δP,t) + ¯ δ + ∆t − δU,t
, (42)
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{i|φi,t=φ} ki,t d , XP,t ≡
 
{i|φi,t=φ} xi,t d , KU,t ≡
 
{i|φi,t=0} ki,t d , HU,t ≡
 
{i|φi,t=0} hi,t d , BU,t ≡
 
{i|φi,t=0} bi,t d , SU,t ≡
 
{i|φi,t=0} si,t d , and θt−1 ≡ [ρPKP,t−1 +





and HB,t > 0 for all t, these equations together with Equations (25) and (26) determine
the equilibrium dynamics of the model recursively. The conditions are veriﬁed in all of the
numerical examples of equilibria considered below.
4 Eﬀects of asset illiquidity and liquidity transformation by banks on aggregate
investment
This section describes an analytical result regarding the negative eﬀect of illiquidity of trees
on aggregate investment in new trees in the baseline case of the model without banks, and
29Regarding the second term on the left-hand side of Equation (38), note that Equations (11), (12) and
(43) imply BB,t + (1 + ζ)VtSB,t = [(1 + ζ)Qt(1 − ˆ δt)−1 − ζωt+1( ¯ Rt)−1]KB,t.
23then shows comparative statics analysis of how introduction of banking to the model economy
changes aggregate investment in new trees.
4.1 The negative illiquidity eﬀect on aggregate investment : Comparison with the complete
information case
To derive equilibrium in the baseline case of the model without banks, impose KB,t = 0 on
Equations (37)-(42) for all t and ignore Equation (43) as this is derived from the maximization
problem for banks (15).
The following proposition shows that aggregate investment in new trees in the baseline
case without banks is lower than in the complete information case.30






























I yi,t d , so that XP,t(Yt)−1 is the ratio of aggregate investment in new trees
to aggregate output. The right-hand side of the inequality, β − (1 − β)(1 − ¯ δ)(φαt)−1, is the
value of XP,t(Yt)−1 in the complete information case as well as in the representative agent
case where φi,t = φ for all i and t, if and only if:
(1 − ¯ δ)(1 + θt−1 − β) ≥ φβαt. (45)
30In the complete information case, the secondary market price of trees, Qt, and the amount of trees
bought by each agent in the secondary market, hi,t, become speciﬁc to the depreciation rate of each tree
in the maximization problem for each agent deﬁned by Equations (1) and (4)-(6). The market clearing
condition for the trees with each depreciation rate must be satisﬁed separately in equilibrium. See Appendix
B.1 for more details on the deﬁnition of the complete information case.
24Also, if Conditions (20) and (45) hold in equilibrium in the baseline case of the model without
banks, then δP,t = 1 − Qtφ > ¯ δ − ∆t.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Given the predetermined value of θt−1, all of the numerical examples considered below
satisfy Condition (45).31 The intuition for this proposition is as follows: In the complete
information case, the competitive secondary market price of each tree reﬂects the depreciation
rate of the tree, which makes all trees liquid in the secondary market. Given Condition (45),
productive agents have enough liquid trees (i.e., high θt−1) to achieve the desired level of
investment in new trees.32 On the other hand, asymmetric information makes a fraction of
trees illiquid in the baseline case of the model without banks. Illiquidity of trees reduces
the sales of trees by productive agents, as conﬁrmed by δP,t > ¯ δ − ∆t, decreasing aggregate
investment in new trees.
4.2 General equilibrium eﬀects of introduction of banking to the economy: Numerical anal-
ysis of comparative statics
To illustrate how introduction of banking to the model economy changes aggregate invest-
ment in new trees, Figure 1 compares the balanced growth paths in the baseline case of the
model without banks and those in the full model with banks under diﬀerent values of the
bank equity holding cost, ζ, ﬁxing the values of the other parameters to their benchmark
values. The benchmark parameter values are set to replicate post-war sample averages of
U.S. data on the balanced growth path in the full model with banks.33
31In the numerical examples below, the arrival of the opportunity to invest in new trees is i.i.d for each
agent (i.e., ρP = 1−ρU) so that θt−1 = ρP(1−ρP)−1. Thus, Condition (45) becomes a parameter restriction.
32In this case, the allocation of net worth among agents is irrelevant for aggregate investment in new trees
and, as a result, the complete information case becomes identical to the representative agent case.
33The benchmark parameter values are (¯ δ, φ, β, ζ, ρP, ρU) = (0.1, 4.75, 0.99, 0.02, 0.45, 0.55), ¯ α = α = 0.03,
and ¯ ∆ = ∆ = 0.09. Suppose the length of a period in the model is a year. For 1948-2007 in the U.S., the
average real GDP growth rate was 3.4%, the average real interest rate on three-month Treasury bills was
3.9%, and the average ratio of the bank credit of commercial banks to the ﬁxed assets in the economy was
25Figure 1 shows that, in the long run, introduction of banking to the model economy
increases XP,t/Yt if the value of ζ is small, but reduces XP,t/Yt otherwise. There are two
opposite eﬀects behind this result. First, the supply of liquid bank liabilities by banks
increases the transfer of goods from unproductive agents to productive agents via sales
of bank liabilities, which expands aggregate investment in new trees. This eﬀect can be
conﬁrmed by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If Condition (20) holds and ˆ δt > ¯ δ, then:
Qt(1 − ¯ δ)












Proof. See Appendix C.
Equation (46) implies that the coeﬃcient of KB,t−1 is larger than that of KU,t−1 in the
aggregate saving rule for productive agents speciﬁed by Equation (37). Thus, a shift in
the saving portfolio of unproductive agents from trees to bank liabilities, which increases
KB,t−1 and reduces KU,t−1, expands investments in new trees by productive agents who were
unproductive buying bank liabilities in the previous period.34 This is a direct positive eﬀect
of introduction of banking on aggregate investment in new trees.
15.0%. These numbers are approximately replicated by the growth rate of aggregate output (Gt−1), ¯ Rt−1,
and KB,t/(KP,t +KU,t +KB,t), in order, on the balanced growth path in the model. (See Equation (47) for
the deﬁnition of the variable Gt.) The capital-asset ratio of banks, VtSB,t(BB,t + VtSB,t)−1, is around 8%,
which is the minimum requirement by the Basel agreement. The 10% annual average depreciation rate of
trees implied by ¯ δ is a standard assumption. Rouwenhoust (1995) reports that the equity premium on S&P
500 was 1.99% on average for 1948-1992. The equity premium on bank equity in the model takes a similar
value. The data sources for the ﬁrst three sample averages are NIPA data from the BEA and ﬁnancial data
from the Federal Reserve Board. Note that ρP = 1−ρU, which implies that the arrival of the opportunity to
produce new trees is i.i.d. for each agent. This assumption is set to reduce the dimension of the parameter
space.
34Appendix C also shows that, if ˆ δt > ¯ δ and λU,t is suﬃciently close to Qt(1 − ˆ δt)−1, then:
Qt(1 − ¯ δ)












26Second, the supply of liquid bank liabilities by banks also raises the expected future
consumption of unproductive agents because they will be able to obtain more goods from
the sales of their assets, and thus consume more, when they become productive in the next
period.35 A resulting decline in the stochastic discount factor, βci,t(ci,t+1)−1, for unproductive
agents, which can be conﬁrmed by an increase in ¯ Rt in the ﬁgure, leads to a drop in the
secondary market price of trees, Qt, through Equation (43).36 Given δP,t = 1 − Qtφ in
the ﬁgure, a decline in Qt increases the illiquid fraction of trees held by productive agents
who were productive investing in new trees in the previous period, which reduces their
investments in new trees. This is an indirect negative eﬀect of introduction of banking on
aggregate investment in new trees.
Figure 1 indicates that, if the bank equity holding cost, ζ, is low, then the positive






In this case, introduction of banking to the model economy makes the value of XP,t/Yt
approach, but remain less than, the value of XP,t/Yt in the complete information case,
β − (1 − β)(1 − ¯ δ)(φαt)−1 (= 0.9268 under the benchmark parameter values). But if the
bank equity holding cost is large, then the opposite result holds as holding bank equity
consumes goods, adding to the indirect negative eﬀect of introduction of banking to the
Thus, if unproductive agents remain unproductive in the next period, then holding bank liabilities can be
ex-post costly as they will lose the opportunity to sell trees with high depreciation rates at an overvalued
secondary market price. Overall, unproductive agents hold bank liabilities if the beneﬁt shown by Proposition
3 exceeds the opportunity cost.
35Equation (34) implies that consumption is increasing in the net worth of the agent deﬁned by Equation
(36).
36See Equation (12) for the relationship between βci,t(ci,t+1)−1 and ¯ Rt. For the baseline case without
banks, ¯ Rt is the hypothetical deposit contract rate with no supply of deposits.
27model economy.37
5 Dynamics of asset illiquidity, asset prices and bank capital requirements
This section describes the equilibrium dynamics of the model, especially highlighting the
illiquidity of trees, the secondary market price of trees, and the capital-asset ratio of banks.
5.1 Dynamics of asset illiquidity and the asset price in the baseline case of the model without
banks
The equilibrium dynamics can be clariﬁed analytically in the baseline case of the model
without banks. When there is no bank, nobody would buy trees in the secondary market
unless unproductive agents do. Thus, hi,t > 0 if φi,t = 0, which leads to λU,t = Qt(1 − ˆ δt)−1
and δU,t = ˆ δt, given Condition (20) and Equations (25) and (26).38 Then, Equations (37)-
(39) and (41) imply that the values of (Qt,ˆ δt) in each period are determined by Equation
(42) and:
Qt
1 − ˆ δt
 











1 − ˆ δt












given the predetermined value of θt−1, the exogenous values of αt and ∆t, and δP,t =
max{¯ δ − ∆t,1 − Qtφ}. Equation (48) can be interpreted as the market clearing condition
37This result crucially depends on the assumption that the bank equity holding cost is a physical cost.
This result might not hold if the equity premium on bank equity is modeled as an endogenous spread due to
some agency problem. Also, note that the indirect negative eﬀect of banking is not internalized by any agent
or bank. Even if the bank equity holding cost is large, agents and banks ﬁnd banking proﬁtable, taking as
given the secondary market price of trees, Qt.
38Condition (20) implies that 1 − Qtφ < ˆ δt. Because δP,t = min{¯ δ − ∆t,1 − Qtφ} and ˆ δt ≤ ¯ δ + ∆t by
deﬁnition, [δP,t, ¯ δ + ∆t] is not an empty set, so productive agents sell some fraction of trees in the market.
Because hi,t = 0 if φi,t = φ, the buyers of trees must be unproductive when there is no bank. Thus hi,t > 0
if φi,t = 0. Then Equations (25) and (26) imply λU,t = Qt(1 − ˆ δt)−1 and δU,t = ˆ δt.
28for trees, where the left-hand side of the equation is the value of trees net of depreciation
that unproductive agents must hold at the end of the period, and the right-hand side is
the fraction of net worth that unproductive agents save. Both sides are normalized by
(1 − ρP)KP,t−1 + ρUKU,t−1.
Figure 2 draws Equations (42) and (48) on the (Qt,ˆ δt) plane and shows how a decline
in αt makes them shift. It is possible to show that the two equations are downward-sloping
and that Equation (48) has a steeper slope than Equation (42) at the intersection of the
two equations if β is suﬃciently close to 1 and Condition (20) is satisﬁed at the intersection.
See Appendix D for the proof. In the ﬁgure, Equation (48) shifts inward as a decline in
αt lowers Qt through decreased aggregate spending on trees due to decreased unproductive
agents’ income, given ˆ δt. Then, given δP,t = 1 − φQt, a decline in the market price of trees,
Qt, discourages productive agents from selling high-quality trees in the secondary market,
leading to an increase in the average depreciation rate of trees sold in the secondary market,
ˆ δt. Thus, the illiquidity of trees for each type of agent indicated by δP,t and ˆ δt (= δU,t) is
negatively correlated with productivity shocks.
Figure 3 shows the eﬀects of an increase in ∆t on the (Qt,ˆ δt) plane, which increases
the degree of asymmetric information in the economy. While Equation (42) shifts upward
unambiguously, the direction of the shift in Equation (48) is ambiguous.39 It can be shown
that Equation (48) shifts inward if δP,t is suﬃciently close to ˆ δt and shifts outward if δP,t ≤ ¯ δ.
See Appendix E for the proof.40 The top panel of Figure 3 shows the ﬁrst case.41 In this
case, a deterioration in asymmetric information increases illiquidity of trees, as indicated by
39As agents sell only low-quality trees in the secondary market, an increase in low-quality trees due to a
higher value of ∆t raises ˆ δt, given Qt.
40The intuition for this result regarding Equation (48) is that an increase in ∆t expands both ends of
the distribution of the depreciation rates so that whether the fraction of trees sold by productive agents
increases or not depends on the level of δP,t. If δP,t is suﬃciently close to ˆ δt, then the fraction of trees sold
by productive agents increases, which in turn reduces Qt through the market clearing condition, given ˆ δt. If
δP,t ≤ ¯ δ, then the fraction of trees sold by productive agents declines, which in turn increases Qt, given ˆ δt.
41Because Equation (42) implies that ˆ δt is close to ¯ δ + ∆t if δP,t is close to ˆ δt, the top panel of Figure 3
is a case where severe adverse selection takes place in the secondary market for trees.
29an upward shift in Equation (42), which in turn reduces the market price of trees, Qt.
Overall, Figures 2 and 3 illustrate that both shocks to αt and ∆t can cause a negative
correlation between Qt and ˆ δt. The next subsection, however, shows that the two types of
shocks have opposite eﬀects on bank capital requirements.
5.2 Cyclicality of bank capital requirements: Numerical analysis of equilibrium dynamics
Now investigate the equilibrium dynamics of the full model with banks, especially highlight-
ing the dynamics of the capital-asset (equity-asset) ratio of banks. Equations (11), (12), (33)






(1 − ˆ δt)βci,t
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Qt+1(ˆ δt+1 − ¯ δ)
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Note that the total value of bank liabilities, BB,t +VtSB,t, equals the value of bank assets in
the balance sheets of banks.
Equation (49) indicates that the equilibrium capital-asset ratio of banks depends on two
factors: the expected value of illiquidity of banks’ trees, ˆ δt+1 − ¯ δ, and the downside risk to
the market value of banks’ trees, αt+1 + Qt+1 − ωt+1. The ﬁrst factor matters as higher
expected illiquidity of bank assets lowers the limit on bank deposits, which increases the
fraction of bank asset value that must be ﬁnanced through bank equity, as described in
Section 3.2. The second factor is relevant because a larger possible decline in the market
value of bank assets requires more bank capital as a buﬀer for preventing bank runs in the
next period. To illustrate that these two factors have opposite eﬀects on the cyclicality of
the capital-asset ratio of banks, Figures 4 and 5 show sample paths of the model driven by
42Equations (11), (12) and (43) imply BB,t + VtSB,t = Qt(1 − ˆ δt)−1KB,t.
30periodic ﬂuctuations in αt and ∆t, respectively.43 See Appendix F for the numerical solution
method.
Figure 4 indicates that the capital-asset ratio of banks is pro-cyclical when business cycles
are driven by productivity shocks, αt. Note that Qt and ˆ δt are, respectively, positively and
negatively correlated with αt, as explained in Section 5.1. Given that the economic growth
rate, Gt, is positively correlated with αt, the positive correlation between Qt and Gt implies
that the largest possible decline in the market value of banks’ trees becomes greater during
economic booms (i.e., when Gt is high) than during downturns (i.e., when Gt is low), which
leads to a pro-cyclical capital-asset ratio of banks. Even though the negative correlation
between ˆ δt and Gt implies that expected illiquidity of banks’ trees is counter-cyclical given
the persistence of shocks, the eﬀect of this factor is dominated by the eﬀect of the pro-cyclical
downside risk to the market value of banks’ trees in the ﬁgure.
In contrast, Figure 5 indicates that the capital-asset ratio of banks is counter-cyclical
when business cycles are driven by changes in ∆t, i.e., changes in the degree of asymmetric
information. In the ﬁgure, Qt and ˆ δt are, respectively, negatively and positively correlated
with ∆t. The underlying mechanism is the same as in the top panel of Figure 3 in Section 5.1.
Also, the economic growth rate, Gt, is negatively correlated with ∆t because an increase in
δP,t due to a rise in ∆t implies higher illiquidity of trees for productive agents, which reduces
aggregate investment in new trees by discouraging productive agents from selling their trees.
While the positive correlation between Qt and Gt and the negative correlation between ˆ δt
and Gt have opposite implications for the cyclicality of the capital-asset ratio of banks, the
eﬀect of the counter-cyclical ﬂuctuations in expected illiquidity of banks’ trees dominates in
43In Figure 4, (¯ α, α, ¯ ηα, η
α) = (0.0306, 0.0294, 0.75, 0.75) and ¯ ∆ = ∆ = 0.09, so the growth rate of output
is around 4% in booms and around 2% in downturns, on average, and the expected durations of booms and
downturns are four years, given that the length of a period in the model is interpreted as a year. In Figure
5, (¯ ∆, ∆, ¯ η∆, η
∆) = (0.1, 0.08, 0.75, 0.75) and ¯ α = α = 0.03. Thus: ∆t ﬂuctuates symmetrically around
the benchmark value, 0.9; ¯ δ − ¯ ∆ = 0; and the expected durations of booms and downturns are four years.
The other parameters take the benchmark values speciﬁed in Footnote 33.
31Figure 5, which leads to a counter-cyclical capital-asset ratio of banks.
5.3 Implications of the model for the “counter-cyclical capital buﬀer” discussed in policy
forums
While bank capital requirements in the model are imposed by rational investors who dislike
losing the internal value of bank assets due to a bank run, the equilibrium dynamics of bank
capital requirements can be seen as a benchmark for regulators who act rationally on behalf of
the public, taking the market prices as given.44 The results suggest that the counter-cyclical
capital buﬀer recommended by the Financial Stability Forum (2009), which requires banks
to increase bank capital in booms to absorb losses in downturns, is suﬃcient to prevent self-
fulﬁlling bank runs when downside risk to the market value of bank assets is the dominant
concern regarding stability of banks. However, if a deterioration in asymmetric information
in the asset market increases the illiquidity of bank assets signiﬁcantly, then banks need to
raise more bank capital during the liquidity crisis to prevent self-fulﬁlling bank runs. This
result is consistent with the recent episode in which, amid a severe decline in market liquidity
of asset-backed securities, short-term lending to Bear Stearns dried up despite satisfying the
supervisory capital standard.45 This result also implies that the counter-cyclical capital
buﬀer will not help to free up bank capital as designed in a liquidity crisis.
6 Why do banks intermediate collateralized lending?
This section extends the model to discuss why banks are engaged with both liquidity trans-
formation and intermediation of collateralized lending in reality. Modifying the assumption
of no borrowing, suppose that productive agents can sell a right to receive a fraction of new
44Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) make a similar interpretation of their models, calling the interpretation
“representative hypothesis”.
45See the letter from the SEC chairman to the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision on March 20,
2008 (http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-48_letter.pdf).
32trees that they invest in up to a certain limit:
mi,t ≥ −ψφi,txi,t, (50)
where mi,t is the net balance of the right to receive new trees, which is positive if the agent
buys the right or negative if the agent sells the right, and ψ (∈ (0,1)) is the pledgeable
fraction of investment in new trees. Assume that pledged new trees are delivered to buyers
before production in the next period so that buyers can use the new trees for their own
production. The price of the right to receive new trees, which is denoted by Pt, is determined
in a competitive market. This price can be interpreted as the collateral value of pledged new
trees as agents receive an amount Pt|mi,t| of goods against a quantity |mi,t| of new trees
pledged as collateral.
The modiﬁed model, which is fully described in Appendix G, implies that productive
agents sell the right to receive new trees up to the limit, given Condition (20). Also, it is
possible to show that Pt equals the highest shadow value of trees net of depreciation among
agents and banks (i.e., Pt = max{maxi∈I λi,t,λB,t}) as those who have the highest shadow
value become the buyers of the right to receive new trees. Equations (24) and (31) imply
λU,t ≤ λB,t. Thus banks become buyers if banks exist. Moreover, if λU,t < λB,t, which is
the case in the numerical examples shown above, then unproductive agents do not buy the
right to receive new trees because the price, which equals to λB,t, is too high. This result
implies that banks intermediate collateralized lending without special ability in enforcing
debt repayment or monitoring borrowers in the model because the ability of banks in pooling
illiquid assets and providing liquid liabilities increases the collateral value of new trees for
banks.
336.1 General equilibrium eﬀects of banking on the collateral value of new real assets
If there is no bank, then unproductive agents buy the right to receive new trees because there
are no other possible buyers. Thus Pt = λU,t in this case. Given Pt = λU,t without banks
and Pt = λB,t with banks, Equations (25) and (31) imply that Pt = Qt(1 − ˆ δ)−1 regardless
of the existence of banks. Assuming that ψ is arbitrarily close to 0, Figure 6 compares the
steady state value of Qt(1 − ˆ δ)−1 with and without banks under the benchmark parameter
values, as in Figure 1. It shows that introduction of banking to the model economy reduces
the collateral value of new trees, Qt(1 − ˆ δ)−1. Figure 1 indicates two opposite eﬀects of
introduction of banking. First, introduction of banking to the model economy reduces the
secondary market price of trees, Qt, by raising the internal rate of return for unproductive
agents, which is represented by ¯ Rt. This eﬀect reduces the collateral value of new trees.
Second, at the same time, a decline in Qt increases the average depreciation rate of trees
sold in the secondary market, ˆ δt, as productive agents are discouraged from selling high-
quality trees, given δP,t = 1 − Qtφ in Figures 1 and 6. This eﬀect increases the collateral
value of new trees because higher illiquidity of trees in the secondary market increases the
attractiveness of new trees, which are free of asymmetric information. However, the ﬁrst
negative eﬀect dominates the second positive eﬀect under the benchmark parameter values.
7 The eﬀect of an alternative bank liquidation procedure on bank capital re-
quirements
So far it has been assumed that a bank hit by a bank run can only sell trees one by one
in the the competitive secondary market. Now suppose that, before a bank run starts, the
bank or the government, foreseeing the bank run, can set up a competitive bank liquidation
market to liquidate the bank’s trees separately from the secondary market for trees. The
comparison of the two markets for bank liquidation is useful to clarify the eﬀect of the bank
34liquidation procedure on bank capital requirements.
It can be shown that the bank or the government’s commitment to setting up a bank
liquidation market separately from the competitive secondary market for trees can prevent
self-fulﬁlling bank runs, making bank capital requirements unnecessary. See Appendix H
for details on the extension of the model and the proof of this result. To understand the
intuition for this result, note that the whole bank’s trees are sold in the bank liquidation
market and that no other seller exists in the market, which prevents adverse selection that
contaminates the secondary market for trees. As a result, the average depreciation rate of
the trees sold in the bank liquidation market equals the average depreciation rate of the
liquidated bank’s trees. Thus the liquidated bank’s trees are priced fairly on average in the
bank liquidation market and the total liquidation value of the liquidated bank’s trees equals
their total fundamental value, i.e., the present discounted value of the current and future
income from the liquidated bank’s trees.46 As rational agents expect this, self-fulﬁlling bank
runs do not occur. Hence the holders of bank liabilities do not need to impose costly bank
capital requirements on banks.
8 Conclusions
This paper has presented a dynamic competitive general equilibrium model of liquidity
transformation by banks, where illiquidity of bank assets leads to endogenous bank capi-
tal requirements for preventing self-fulﬁlling bank runs. The model shows that bank capital
requirements depend on two factors, downside risk to the market value of bank assets and
expected illiquidity of bank assets. It is shown that these two factors ﬂuctuate with shocks
to the economy, making bank capital requirements dynamic. The model suggests that the
counter-cyclical capital buﬀer recommended by the Financial Stability Forum (2009) is suf-
46The market price of trees is determined by the average depreciation of trees sold in the bank liquidation
market, as in the secondary market for trees.
35ﬁcient to prevent self-fulﬁlling bank runs when downside risk to the market value of bank
assets is the dominant concern regarding stability of banks. This result regarding the rela-
tionship between volatile bank asset value and the counter-cyclical capital buﬀer adds to the
ﬁndings of Meh and Moran (2010). In their model, banks need to ﬁnance part of lending
to borrowers through their own capital to commit to eﬃcient monitoring services. If banks
suﬀer from unexpected loan losses, then bank capital requirements decline as the scarcity of
bank capital gives greater incentive for banks to monitor borrowers during such an episode.
The model, however, also shows that if a deterioration in asymmetric information in
the asset market increases the illiquidity of bank assets signiﬁcantly, then banks need to
raise more bank capital during the liquidity crisis to prevent self-fulﬁlling bank runs. This
result implies that the counter-cyclical capital buﬀer will not help to free up bank capital as
designed in a liquidity crisis.
A question arises from this result regarding how a concern about a future liquidity cri-
sis would modify bank capital requirements. Because it is diﬃcult to raise bank capital in
a liquidity crisis in reality, concern about a future liquidity crisis might increase desirable
bank capital requirements during a boom, unless there is some insurance mechanism for the
liquidity crisis, such as contingent capital. To answer this question, it would be necessary to
incorporate the diﬃculty in raising bank capital in a liquidity crisis by introducing hetero-
geneous banks and asymmetric information about the quality of each bank’s assets in the
model. This issue is left for future research.
In addition, the model shows that the level of bank capital requirements declines if the
bank liquidation procedure can avoid undervaluation of banks’ illiquid assets. The same
result would hold if the government or the central bank could commit to lending to banks
hit by bank runs up to the fundamental value of bank assets, rather than the market value of
bank assets at illiquid market prices. Thus, along with improving the eﬀectiveness of bank
capital regulations, it is important to design an eﬃcient bank liquidation procedure and an
36eﬃcient emergency lending facility for distressed banks to minimize the necessity of bank
capital requirements, given the cost of equity ﬁnancing for banks.
37Figure 1: Comparative statics: balanced growth paths with and without banks






















































Notes: The horizontal axis is the value of ζ. The other parameter values are (¯ δ, φ, β, ρP, ρU)
= (0.1, 4.75, 0.99, 0.45, 0.55), ¯ α = α = 0.03 and ¯ ∆ = ∆ = 0.09. The solid lines represent
the model with banks and the dashed lines represent the model without banks.
38Figure 2: Dynamic equilibrium without banks: the eﬀect of a decline in αt













Notes: For each curve in the ﬁgure, parameter values used are (¯ δ, φ, β, ζ, ρP, ρU) = (0.1,
4.75, 0.99, 0.02, 0.45, 0.55) and ¯ ∆ = ∆ = 0.09. The solid lines are Equations (42) and (48)
with αt = 0.03 and the dashed lines are these equations with αt = 0.027. Given ρP = 1−ρU,
θt−1 = ρP(1 − ρP)−1 for all t, regardless of shocks.
39Figure 3: Dynamic equilibrium without banks: the eﬀect of an increase in ∆t
(a)





























Notes: Parameter values used are: (¯ δ, φ, β, ζ) = (0.1, 4.75, 0.99, 0.02), ¯ α = α = 0.03
and ¯ ∆ = ∆ = 0.09 for both panels; (ρP, ρU) = (0.45, 0.55) for the top panel; and (ρP,
ρU) = (0.2, 0.8) for the bottom panel. In each panel, the solid lines are Equations (42)
and (48) with ∆t = 0.09 and the dashed lines are these equations with ∆t = 0.099. Given
ρP = 1 − ρU, θt−1 = ρP(1 − ρP)−1 for all t, regardless of shocks.
40Figure 4: Dynamic equilibrium with banks: business cycles driven by αt











































































Notes: Parameter values are (¯ δ, φ, β, ζ, ρP, ρU) = (0.1, 4.75, 0.99, 0.02, 0.45, 0.55), (¯ α, α)
= (0.0306, 0.0294), ¯ ηα = η
α = 0.75, and ¯ ∆ = ∆ = 0.09. The ﬁgure shows a sample path
when αt keeps changing its value every 4 periods for a suﬃciently long time. HU,t = 0 for
all periods.
41Figure 5: Dynamic equilibrium with banks: business cycles driven by ∆t














































































Notes: Parameter values are (¯ δ, φ, β, ζ, ρP, ρU) = (0.1, 4.75, 0.99, 0.02, 0.45, 0.55),
¯ α = α = 0.03, (¯ ∆, ∆) = (0.1, 0.08), and ¯ η∆ = η
∆ = 0.75. The ﬁgure shows a sample path
when ∆t keeps changing its value every 4 periods for a suﬃciently long time. HU,t = 0 for
all periods.
42Figure 6: Comparative statics: the collateral value of new trees (Qt(1 − ˆ δt)−1) with and
without banks













Notes: The horizontal axis is the value of ζ. The other parameter values take the benchmark
values speciﬁed in Section 4.2: (¯ δ, φ, β, ρP, ρU) = (0.1, 4.75, 0.99, 0.45, 0.55), ¯ α = α = 0.03
and ¯ ∆ = ∆ = 0.09. The ﬁgure shows the limit case where ψ is arbitrarily close to 0, given
the other parameter values. The solid line represents the model with banks and the dashed
line represents the model without banks.
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47Appendices
A Proof of Proposition 1
The following lemma will be used in the proof.
Lemma 1 Suppose that Ωt+1 satisﬁes Equations (27)-(29) for period t + 1. Split the con-
straint set of the maximization problem (15) into three regions: ¯ RtBB,t ≤ ωt+1KB,t; ¯ RtBB,t ∈
(ωt+1KB,t, ¯ ωt+1KB,t]; and ¯ RtBB,t > ¯ ωt+1KB,t. Then, in equilibrium, ¯ RtBB,t equals ωt+1KB,t
at optimum in the ﬁrst region and ¯ ωt+1KB,t at optimum in the second region.
Proof. Use the Lagrange method to solve the maximization problem in the ﬁrst and the
second regions. For the second region, solve the maximization problem in the closure of the
region and suppose that Ωt+1 takes the limit value when ¯ RtBB,t = ωt+1KB,t. This makes the
function Ωt+1 diﬀerentiable in each region. This expansion of the second region does not aﬀect
the solution to the maximization problem, since it will be shown that ¯ RtBB,t = ¯ ωt+1KB,t at
optimum in the second region.
In the ﬁrst region, ¯ Rt is determined solely by Equation (12) and can be taken as exogenous
for the representative bank. Equation (12) implies that ¯ Rt > 0, since agents never choose
zero consumption with the time-separable log utility function in equilibrium. The ﬁrst-order









   
 φi,t = 0
 
− ¯ θrgn1,t ¯ Rt+1 = 0, (51)
where ¯ θrgn1,t is the Lagrange multiplier for the upper bound of the ﬁrst region ( ¯ RtBB,t ≤
ωt+1KB,t). Thus, ¯ θrgn1,t = ζ(1 + ζ)−1( ¯ Rt)−1 > 0, given ζ > 0 and ¯ Rt > 0. Hence, ¯ RtBB,t =
ωt+1KB,t at optimum in the ﬁrst region.
48For the second region, if KB,t = 0, then the claim is automatically satisﬁed since Equation
(12) implies that BB,t must be 0, given that KB,t(BB,t)−1 in the equation is replaced with
inﬁnity if BB,t = 0, as deﬁned in the main text. Hereafter suppose KB,t > 0 in the second
region. In equilibrium, Qt is alway positive and thus ωt > 0 for all t, since otherwise each
agent would demand an inﬁnite amount of trees in the secondary market, which would violate
the market clearing condition for trees. In the second region, KB,t > 0 and ωt+1 > 0 imply
that BB,t > 0 and ¯ Rt > 0, since BB,t must be non-negative by the non-negativity constraint.










   φi,t = 0, αt+1 + Qt+1 = ¯ ωt+1
 





















 φi,t = 0, αt+1 + Qt+1 = ¯ ωt+1
 





   
 
 φi,t = 0, αt+1 + Qt+1 = ¯ ωt+1
 
= 0, (53)
where ¯ θrgn2,t is the Lagrange multiplier for the upper bound of the closure of the second
region ( ¯ RtBB,t ≤ ¯ ωt+1KB,t), θrgn2,t is the Lagrange multiplier for the lower bound of the
closure of the second region ( ¯ RtBB,t ≥ ωt+1KB,t), and ¯ θPC,t is the Lagrange multiplier for
Equation (12). Equations (52) and (53) imply that θPC,t = BB,t. Substituting this into
Equation (52) leads to:








   
 φi,t = 0, αt+1 + Qt+1 = ¯ ωt+1
 
, (54)
49which in turn indicates that ¯ θrgn2,t > 0 and θrgn2,t = 0, given ζ > 0 and ¯ Rt > 0. Thus,
¯ RtBB,t = ¯ ωt+1KB,t at optimum in the second region.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Suppose that Ωt+1 satisﬁes Equations (27)-(29) for period t + 1. Note that Equation (27)
satisﬁes the bank-run conditions (9) and (10).
To verify Equation (27), split the constraint set of the maximization problem (15) into
three regions: ¯ RtBB,t ≤ ωt+1KB,t; ¯ RtBB,t ∈ (ωt+1KB,t, ¯ ωt+1KB,t]; and ¯ RtBB,t > ¯ ωt+1KB,t.
First of all, any point in the third region, ¯ RtBB,t > ¯ ωt+1KB,t, is weakly dominated by
¯ RtBB,t = ¯ ωt+1KB,t, since the feasible set of the choice variables is identical and the value of
Ωt+1 is always 0 in the third region while it can be positive with ¯ RtBB,t = ¯ ωt+1KB,t. Thus,
the third region can be ignored.
By Lemma 1, ¯ RtBB,t = ωt+1KB,t and ¯ RtBB,t = ¯ ωt+1KB,t at optimum in the ﬁrst and the
second regions, respectively. Denote the maximum values of the objective function of the
maximization problem (15) in the ﬁrst and the second regions by Ω′
t and Ω′′
t, respectively.
Given that Ωt+1 satisﬁes Equations (27)-(29) for period t + 1, substituting the optimal
values of ¯ RtBB,t in the ﬁrst and the second regions and Equations (9), (10) and (12) into
the objective function of the maximization problem (15) yields:
Ω
′





t = αtKB,t−1 − Qt(HB,t − LB,t) − ˜ RtBB,t−1 + λ
′′
B,tKB,t. (56)
The global solution to the maximization problem (15) can be obtained by maximizing the
values of Ω′
t and Ω′′
t with satisfying Equation (8), LB,t ∈ [0,KB,t−1] and HB,t ≥ 0. Since the











B,t. This result proves Equations (28)-(30).
50Given this result, now prove Equations (31) and (32). The maximization problem (15)
can be rewritten as:
Ωt = max
{HB,t,LB,t}
αtKB,t−1 − Qt(HB,t − LB,t) − ˜ RtBB,t−1 + λB,tKB,t,
s.t. Equations (8),(9) and (10), LB,t ∈ [0,KB,t−1], HB,t ≥ 0, (57)









B,t. The maximization problem (57) implies that the equilibrium
value of λB,t satisﬁes:
λB,t

          
          
= Qt(1 − ˆ δt)−1, if HB,t > 0,
= Qt(1 − ¯ δ)−1, if LB,t ∈ (0,KB,t−1),
≤ Qt(1 − ¯ δ)−1, if LB,t = KB,t−1,
∈ [Qt(1 − ¯ δ)−1, Qt(1 − ˆ δt)−1], if HB,t = 0 and LB,t = 0.
(58)
When ˆ δt > ¯ δ, Equation (58) implies that LB,t = 0 if HB,t > 0 and that HB,t = 0 if
LB,t > 0. Thus Equations (31) and (32) are proved. Substituting Equations (8) and (58) in
the objection function in the maximization problem (57) proves Equation (27).
B Proof of Proposition 2
B.1 Part I: Deﬁnition of the complete information case of the model without banks
Suppose that the depreciation rate of each tree in each period is public information and
that there exists a competitive secondary market for trees with each depreciation rate in the
model without banks. The maximization problem for each agent deﬁned by Equations (1)









s.t. ci,t + xi,t = αtki,t−1 +
  ¯ δ+∆t
¯ δ−∆t
Qδ,tli,δ,t dδ, (60)
ki,t = φi,txi,t +












, ci,t ≥ 0, xi,t ≥ 0, (62)
where Qδ,t is the secondary market price of trees with depreciation rate δ and li,δ,t is the
net sales of trees in the secondary market if positive or the net purchase of trees in the
secondary market if negative. The variable hi,t and the non-negativity constraint on li,δ,t
are erased as they are not needed, given the change in the deﬁnition of li,δ,t. The market
clearing condition (17) is modiﬁed to
  ¯ δ+∆t
¯ δ−∆t li,δ,t dδ = 0 for δ ∈ [¯ δ − ∆t,¯ δ + ∆t]. The other
equilibrium condition, Equation (16), does not exist in the complete information case, since
the variable ˆ δt does not exist.
Suppose that Qδ,t(1 − δ)−1 = φ
−1 for all δ ∈ [¯ δ − ∆t,¯ δ + ∆t]. The ﬁrst-order condition
with respect to ki,t implies that:
ci,t = (1 − β)
 
α +













for all i ∈ I. Then aggregating (64) implies that KP,t + KU,t = β
 
φαt + 1 − ¯ δ
 
(KP,t−1 +
KU,t−1). Since aggregating Equation (61) and substituting the market clearing condition
yield that φXP,t = KP,t + KU,t − (1 − ¯ δ)(KP,t−1 + KU,t−1), the ratio of aggregate investment
in new trees to aggregate output, XP,t(Yt)−1, equals β − (1 − β)(1 − ¯ δ)(φαt)−1, given Yt =
52αt(KP,t−1 + KU,t−1).
To verify Qδ,t(1 − δ)−1 = φ
−1 for all δ ∈ [¯ δ − ∆t,¯ δ + ∆t], it is necessary and suﬃcient
to check the remaining equilibrium condition, li,δ,t ≤
ki,t−1
2∆t for all δ ∈ [¯ δ − ∆t,¯ δ + ∆t].
Given Equation (61), this is satisﬁed if and only if KP,t ≥ φXP,t. This is equivalent to
KU,t ≤ (1−¯ δ)(KP,t−1 +KU,t−1) and substituting this condition in Equation (64) aggregated
for unproductive agents (i.e., KU,tφ
−1 = β[α+(1−¯ δ)φ
−1][(1−ρP)KP,t−1+ρUKU,t−1]) yields
that this condition is in turn equivalent to (1 − ¯ δ)(1 + θt−1 − β) ≥ φβαt.
B.2 Part II: Comparison between the baseline case and the complete information case
Suppose Condition (20) holds in equilibrium in the model without banks. Show that:




















The left-hand side is equivalent to:
φβαt − (1 − β)θt−1




dδ − (1 − β)(1 − ¯ δ)
−





= φβαt − (1 − β)
 
θt−1


















1 − ˆ δt
  ¯ δ+∆t
δP,t
1 − ˆ δt
2∆t
dδ
> φβαt − (1 − β)





  ¯ δ+∆t
ˆ δt






1 − ˆ δt
  ¯ δ+∆t
δP,t
1 − ˆ δt
2∆t
dδ. (66)
53The last inequality is obtained by Condition (20), which implies φQt(1 − ˆ δt)−1 > 1, and
Equation (42), which implies:
θt−1
  ¯ δ+∆t
δP,t
1 − ˆ δt
2∆t
dδ +
  ¯ δ+∆t
ˆ δt
1 − ˆ δt
2∆t
dδ = θt−1










Equation (42), which is equivalent to Equation (67), and Equation (48) imply that:
Qt





  ¯ δ+∆t
δP,t
1 − ˆ δt
2∆t
dδ + (1 − β)





  ¯ δ+∆t
ˆ δt





Substituting this into βαt on the right-hand side of Inequality (66) implies that the right-




1 − ˆ δt
− 1





  ¯ δ+∆t
ˆ δt





This is positive, given Condition (20).
Also, suppose that Conditions (20) and (45) hold and that δP,t = ¯ δ − ∆t in equilibrium.
Then Equations (67) and (68) imply that Qt(1 − ˆ δt)−1 ≤ βα[(1 + θt−1 − β)(1 − ¯ δ)]−1. This
contradicts Condition (45), given Condition (20). Thus, if Conditions (20) and (45) hold in
equilibrium, then δP,t > ¯ δ − ∆t.
54C Proof of Proposition 3
It is obvious that Inequality (46) holds when δP,t = ¯ δ − ∆ or δP,t = ¯ δ + ∆, given ˆ δt > ¯ δ and
Condition (20). When δP,t = 1 − φQt:
Qt(1 − ¯ δ)
1 − ˆ δt
−















x(1 − ¯ δ)
1 − ˆ δt
−












x ≡ φQt, y ≡ ¯ δ − ∆, z ≡ ¯ δ + ∆. (71)
Given the value of ˆ δt, the right-hand side of Equation (70) can be rewritten as a quadratic
function of x. Note that x ∈ [1 − z,1 − y] by the deﬁnition of δP,t given by Equation
(26). Since the coeﬃcient of x2 is negative, the right-hand side takes the minimum value for
x ∈ [1−z,1−y] when x = 1−z or x = 1−y. In either case, the minimum value is positive,
and so is the right-hand side of Equation (70) for x ∈ [1 − z,1 − y].
In addition, prove the inequality in Footnote 34. Suppose λU,t = Qt(1 − ˆ δt)−1. Then
δU,t = ˆ δt by Equation (26). Given ˆ δt > ¯ δ, it holds that:
Qt(1 − ¯ δ)
1 − ˆ δt
−












Qt(1 − ¯ δ)
1 − ˆ δt
−
   ˆ δt
¯ δ−∆t
Qt(1 − δ)
(1 − ˆ δt)2∆t
dδ +







Qt(1 − ¯ δ)
1 − ˆ δt
− Qt > 0. (72)
By continuity, the inequality in Footnote 34 holds if λU,t is suﬃciently close to Qt(1−ˆ δt)−1.
55D Slopes of Equations (42) and (48)
Lemma 2 Equation (48) is a downward-sloping curve on the (Qt,ˆ δt) plane, given the values
of αt, ∆t and θt−1. Equation (42) is also downward-sloping, if δP,t = 1 − φQt, and is a
ﬂat line, if δP,t = ¯ δ − ∆t. Equation (48) has a steeper slope than Equation (42) at the
intersection of the two curves, if β is suﬃciently close to 1 and Condition (20) is satisﬁed
at the intersection.
Proof. Denote the implicit functions for ˆ δt implied by Equations (42) and (48) by ˆ δt =
h(Qt, αt, ∆t, θt−1) and ˆ δt = ℓ(Qt, αt, ∆t, θt−1), respectively.
There are two cases to consider. The ﬁrst case is that δP,t = 1 − φQt at the intersection
of the two curves and the second case is that δP,t = ¯ δ − ∆t at the intersection.
In the ﬁrst case, it can be shown that:
∂h(Qt, αt, ∆t, θt−1)
∂Qt
= −
θt−1φˆ δt(1 − δP,t)
θt−1(¯ δ + ∆t − δP,t) + ¯ δ + ∆t − ˆ δt
, (73)














  , (74)
which are always strictly negative. This result proves that the implicit functions h and ℓ exist
by the implicit function theorem and that Equations (42) and (48) are downward-sloping on
the (Qt,ˆ δt) plane.
56It can be shown that
∂ℓ(Qt, αt, ∆t, θt−1)
∂Qt −
∂h(Qt, αt, ∆t, θt−1)
∂Qt has the same sign with:
−
 








θt−1(¯ δ + ∆t − δP,t)
+¯ δ + ∆t − ˆ δt
 













θt−1(¯ δ + ∆t − δP,t) + ¯ δ + ∆t − ˆ δt
 
− θt−1φ(1 − δP,t)
 











At the intersection of Equations (42) and (48), it holds that:















1 − ˆ δt
 
θt−1























1 − ˆ δt
 
−
ˆ δt(1 − β)
1 − ˆ δt





The ﬁrst equality is obtained from Equation (48) and the second equality is obtained from
57Equation (42). Note that:
ˆ δt
1 − ˆ δt
≤
¯ δ + ∆t
1 − (¯ δ + ∆t)
, (77)




dδ ≤ 1 − ¯ δ, (78)
since ˆ δt ≤ ¯ δ + ∆t. Thus, the last term on the last line of Equation (76) goes to 0 as β
goes to 1, if equilibrium continues to exist. Because Condition (20) and Equation (26) imply
that δP,t < ˆ δt in equilibrium, this result proves that
∂ℓ(Qt, αt, ∆t, θt−1)
∂Qt <
∂h(Qt, αt, ∆t, θt−1)
∂Qt at
the intersection of Equations (42) and (48) for the ﬁrst case (i.e., δP,t = 1 − Qtφ), if β is
suﬃciently close to 1.
For the second case (i.e., δP,t = ¯ δ − ∆t), Equation (42) implies that ˆ δt is constant. Also,












Thus, the implicit functions h and ℓ exist and Equation (48) has a steeper slope than
Equation (42) on the (Qt,ˆ δt) plane.
E Shifts in Equation (48) in response to changes in ∆t
Rewrite Equation (48) to deﬁne a function g:
g(ˆ δt,Qt,αt,∆t,θt−1) ≡
Qt
1 − ˆ δt
 











1 − ˆ δt














∂Qt > 0, an increase in ∆t makes Equation (48) shift inward if
∂g
∂∆t > 0 and outward
if
∂g
∂∆t < 0. The following Lemma shows that both cases exist.
Lemma 3
∂g
∂∆t > 0, if δP,t is suﬃciently close to ˆ δt.
∂g
∂∆t < 0, if δP,t ≤ ¯ δ.
Proof. Take the partial derivative:




1 − ˆ δt
 









1 − (¯ δ − ∆t)
2∆t
−




1 − ˆ δt
2∆t
−
  ¯ δ+∆t
ˆ δt




It can be shown that:










< 0, if δP,t ≤ ¯ δ,
> 0, if δP,t is suﬃciently close to ¯ δ + ∆t,
(82)
given ∆t ∈ (0,1 − ¯ δ) and ¯ δ ∈ (0,1).
Also, given ˆ δt ∈ [¯ δ,¯ δ + ∆t] by Equation (42), it can be shown that:
−
 
1 − (¯ δ − ∆t) −




dδ + 1 − ˆ δt −
  ¯ δ+∆t
ˆ δt





where the equality holds if and only if ˆ δt = ¯ δ+∆t. Note that Equation (42) implies that ˆ δt is
suﬃciently close to ¯ δ+∆t if δP,t is suﬃciently close to ¯ δ+∆t. Thus, substituting Inequalities
(82) and (83) in Equation (81) proves the proposition.
59F The numerical solution method for the equilibrium dynamics of the model
with banks
The dynamic equilibrium is approximated by the following projection method:
Step 0. It can be shown that the dynamic equilibrium in each period is homogeneous
of degree 1 with respect to KP,t−1, KU,t−1 and KB,t−1. Set grid points on the
state space for KP,t−1, KU,t−1 and the shock parameter (αt or ∆t). The value of
KB,t−1 is set to 1−KP,t−1 −KU,t−1 on each grid point. Guess the equilibrium
values of endogenous variables on each grid point, including ¯ ωt+1 and ωt+1.
Call this correspondence between state variables and endogenous variables as
a ‘candidate array’.
Step 1. Suppose the candidate array returns equilibrium values in the next period for
each set of KP,t, KU,t and the shock parameter. The next-period equilibrium
values on a point between the grid points in the state space are approximated
by linear interpolation. Given this, derive the candidate array for the current
period through the aggregate equilibrium conditions.
Step 2. Compare the candidate arrays for the current period and for the next period.
If the ratio of each element between the two arrays becomes suﬃciently close to
1, then take the candidate array as the equilibrium correspondence. Otherwise,
update the candidate array for the next period by a linear combination of the
two arrays and go back to Step 1.
In the numerical examples in this paper, I set grid points in the ± 5% range of the
deterministic steady state values of KP,t−1 and KU,t−1. The number of grid points are 20
60for these endogenous state variables. Note that the shock parameter only takes two values
by assumption. The convergence criterion in Step 2 is 1e-03. In updating the candidate
array in Step 2, the weight on the candidate array for the current period is 0.001. The
initial guess in Step 0 is obtained through homotopy starting from the parameter values
with which deterministic steady state values given the value of the shock parameter are a
successful initial guess of the candidate array that leads to convergence.
The equilibrium conditions are checked for each element of the converged candidate
array. For each ﬁgure, random simulations of the dynamics for 5000 periods conﬁrm that
the equilibrium dynamics move within the grid points that satisfy the equilibrium conditions.
G The modiﬁcation of the model when agents can borrow against new trees
In addition to the short-sale constraint on new trees (50), the ﬂow-of-funds constraint (4)
and the law of motion for trees net of depreciation (5) for each agent are modiﬁed to:
Ptmi,t + ci,t + xi,t + Qthi,t + bi,t + (1 + ζ)Vtsi,t
= αtki,t−1 + Qt
  ¯ δ+∆t
¯ δ−∆t
li,δ,t dδ + ˜ Rtbi,t−1 + (Dt + Vt)si,t−1, (84)
ki,t = mi,t + φi,txi,t + (1 − ˆ δt)hi,t +









where Pt is the competitive market price of pledged new trees. Similarly, the ﬂow-of-funds
constraint and the maximization problem for the representative bank are modiﬁed to:
KB,t = MB,t + (1 − ˆ δt)HB,t + (1 − ¯ δ)(KB,t−1 − LB,t), (86)
61Ωt(KB,t−1,BB,t−1, ¯ Rt−1) ≡
max
{HB,t,LB,t,BB,t, ¯ Rt,MB,t}
PtMB,t + αtKB,t−1 − Qt(HB,t − LB,t) − ˜ RtBB,t−1





s.t. Equations (9),(10),(12) and (86), LB,t ∈ [0,KB,t−1], MB,t,HB,t,BB,t ≥ 0, (87)
where MB,t is the amount of the right to receive new trees bought by the bank. The market
clearing condition for the right to receive new trees is:
 
i∈I
mi,t d  + MB,t = 0, (88)
which is added to the equilibrium conditions listed in Section 2.4.
The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to xi,t and mi,t imply that:
Pt = λi,t, if mi,t > 0, (89)




, if φi,t = φ. (91)
Similarly, the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to MB,t yields that:
Pt = λB,t, if MB,t > 0, (92)
MB,t = 0, if Pt > λB,t. (93)
Equations (89), (90), (92) and (93) imply that Pt = max{maxi∈I λi,t,λB,t}, given that there
exist sellers of the right to receive new trees (i.e., agents with mi,t < 0). Then Condition
(20) implies that Pt is greater than φ
−1, which is in turn greater than λi,t for productive
agents, given Equation (91). Thus, mi,t = −ψφi,txi,t if φi,t = φ. These results prove that,
62given Condition (20), productive agents sell the right to receive new trees and unproductive
agents buy the right to receive new trees (Pt = λU,t and mi,t > 0 if φi,t = 0) if there is no
bank. If banks exist and Equation (31) hold, then Equation (24) implies that banks buy the
right to receive new trees (Pt = λB,t and MB,t > 0), as described in Section 6.
H The eﬀect of an alternative bank liquidation procedure
Suppose that, if a bank run is expected to happen, then the bank or the government sets up
a competitive bank liquidation market to sell the bank’s trees separately from the secondary
market for trees. Modify the maximization problem for each agent deﬁned by Equations (1)
and (4)-(6) as follows:
max














= αtki,t−1 + Qt
  ¯ δ+∆t
¯ δ−∆t
li,δ,t dδ + ˜ Rtbi,t−1 + (Dt + Vt)si,t−1, (95)
ki,t = φi,txi,t + (1 − ˆ δt)hi,t + (1 − ¯ δ)h
LB
i,t +

















i,t ≥ 0, (97)
where QLB
t is the competitive price of the liquidated bank’s trees in the bank liquidation
market and hLB
i,t is the quantity of trees bought in the bank liquidation market. Note that
the average depreciation rate of trees sold in the bank liquidation market equals ¯ δ, since all
of the liquidated bank’s trees are sold in the bank liquidation market and no agent can sell
their trees there. Thus (1−¯ δ)hLB
i,t in Equation (96) is the quantity of trees net of depreciation
63obtained through the bank liquidation market.
Similarly, the maximization problem for banks that are not hit by bank runs is modiﬁed
to:








B,t − ˜ RtBB,t−1






KB,t = (1 − ˆ δt)HB,t + (1 − ¯ δ)H
LB









BB,t−1 , if ¯ Rt−1BB,t−1 > (αt + QLB
t )KB,t−1,
(100)
Ωt = 0, if ¯ Rt−1BB,t−1 > (αt + Q
LB
t )KB,t−1 (101)
Equations (12), LB,t ∈ [0,KB,t−1], HB,t ≥ 0, BB,t ≥ 0, H
LB
B,t ≥ 0, (102)
where HLB
B,t is the quantity of trees obtained through the bank liquidation market, given no
bank run to the representative bank. Note that the second constraint implies that a bank
run occurs if the face value of deposits exceeds the liquidation value of the bank evaluated
by QLB
t . Also, Ωt = 0 in the third constraint is equivalent to Dt = Vt = 0 in Equation (10).
The marker clearing condition for the liquidated bank’s trees is
 
I hLB




t is the total quantity of the liquidated bank’s trees. In equilibrium, this condition
and Equations (16)-(19) are satisﬁed in each period and the modiﬁed maximization problems
above are solved with rational expectations.
It can be shown that a modiﬁed version of Proposition 1 holds if the deﬁnitions of ¯ ωt+1
64and ωt+1 are modiﬁed to the high and the low values of αt+1 + QLB
t+1, respectively, and Qt
and Qt+1 in Equations (27)-(30) are replaced with QLB
t and QLB
t+1, respectively. Equations
(31) and (32) hold as they are.
Given this result, the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to hi,t and HB,t in the max-
imization problems for agents and banks above imply that Qt − λi,t(1 − ˆ δt) ≥ 0 and
Qt − λB,t(1 − ˆ δt) ≥ 0, where the equalities hold if hi,t > 0 and HB,t > 0, respectively.
Similarly, the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to hLB
i,t and HLB
B,t in the maximization prob-
lems for agents and banks yield that QLB
t −λi,t(1−¯ δ) ≥ 0 and QLB
t −λB,t(1−¯ δ) ≥ 0, where
the equalities hold if hLB
i,t > 0 and HLB
B,t > 0, respectively. Without loss of generality, assume
that QLB
t − λi,t(1 −¯ δ) = 0 for some i ∈ I or QLB
t −λB,t(1 −¯ δ) = 0 in equilibrium if there is
no liquidated bank.
Now suppose HB,t > 0 for all t, which implies that banks are always providing liquidity
transformation services. Then the inequalities shown above indicate that λB,t = Qt(1 −
ˆ δt)−1 ≥ λi,t for all i ∈ I. Thus QLB
t = λB,t(1 − ¯ δ) = Qt(1 − ˆ δt)−1(1 − ¯ δ). Given Proposition
1 revised for the maximization problem (98)-(102), this result implies that ˜ RtBB,t−1 +(Dt +
Vt)SB,t−1 = [αt + Qt(1 − ˆ δt)−1(1 − ¯ δ)]KB,t−1 for any value of ¯ Rt−1BB,t−1. Hence the bank
liquidation market values the liquidated bank’s trees fairly and the total value of bank
liabilities always equals the present discounted value of the current and future income from
the liquidated bank’s tree. As rational agents expect this, they do not run to banks.




B,t and ˜ RtBB,t = ¯ ωt+1KB,t, if ζ > 0. This result
implies that, since the bank liquidation market values the liquidated bank’s trees fairly, the
holders of bank liabilities are indiﬀerent to bank failures, so that equity holders do not impose
costly bank capital requirements. The contingent pay-oﬀ to deposits becomes equivalent to
the pay-oﬀ to bank equity without the bank-equity holding cost in this case.
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